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Abstract
Using the English Housing Survey, we estimate a supply side selection model
of the allocation of properties to the owner-occupied and rental sectors. We find
that location, structure and unobserved quality are important for understanding
housing prices, rents and selection. Structural characteristics and unobserved qual-
ity are important for selection. Location is not. Accounting for selection is impor-
tant for estimates of rent-to-price ratios and can explain some puzzling correlations
between rent-to-price ratios and homeownership rates. We interpret this as strong
evidence in favor of contracting frictions in the rental market likely related to hous-
ing maintenance.
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1 Introduction
Homeownership is puzzling. Why is the market share of the owner-occupied sector
in most developed countries so large relative to that of the rental sector? On the de-
mand side, numerous theoretical explanations have been proposed, including insurance
motives, tax considerations, and a “warm glow” from housing. On the supply side,
theories have focused on a variety of contracting problems between renters and land-
lords. Most of these theories have implications not only for the aggregate market share
of homeownership, but also for which properties are owned and which are rented and
how rent-to-price ratios might vary across properties. Yet surprisingly little is known
empirically about the supply side choices that govern which housing characteristics are
likely to be owned rather than rented and about how rent-to-price ratios vary across the
urban landscape.
Casual empiricism suggests that large, detached, expensive, suburban houses are
more likely to be owned while smaller, cheaper apartments in urban centers are less
likely to be owned. These simple correlations mask a much more nuanced picture. The
market share of homeownership, the rent-to-price ratio, and the physical characteristics
of the housing stock all vary dramatically across the urban landscape. How do dwelling
prices and rents vary with the propensity to be selected into owner-occupancy? What
do the empirical patterns imply about user costs and contracting frictions in the rental
and owner-occupied markets?
These are crucial questions for understanding how household choices are affected
by local geography. They are also crucial because they are intimately tied together with
important macroeconomic questions about household savings and insurance against fi-
nancial risks. In the UK and the US more than 60% of households tie up a large part
of their financial portfolio in a single, risky, illiquid asset; housing. Why is this the
case? Why don’t financial and rental housing markets provide contracts that enable
households to enjoy the consumption flow from a rented three bedroom detached 120
square-meter house in the suburbs while enjoying the dividend flows and potential cap-
ital gains of the wider financial market?
Our approach is straightforward. We use a rich micro data set to estimate a sim-
ple model of the supply of housing to the rental and owner-occupied housing markets,
exploiting the tremendous variation in dwelling characteristics, prices, rents and own-
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ership rates within London between 2008-2012. We model the economy as endowed
with a set of properties. Landlord and owner-occupiers take prices and rents as given.
A property ends up in either the rental or owner-occupied part of the housing market
depending on which part of the market values the property more. We then analyze the
implications of our findings in the context of the simplest possible dynamic setting. We
find that:
1. Observable physical characteristics of a property are by far the most important
determinants of the probability of being in the owner-occupied sector. Hous-
ing units with high value physical attributes (large or more detached dwellings)
are more likely to be owner-occupied. At the same time, rent-to-price ratios for
these “large” properties are higher than for smaller properties. In other words,
despite their relatively high gross yield in the rental sector, properties with high
value physical characteristics are less likely to be bought up by landlords and
supplied to renters. These relationships are fairly stable over time despite large
changes in property prices during the time period. This is consistent with the
theory that agency problems in the rental sector increase the cost of upkeep and
care1 for properties relative to the cost in the owner-occupied sector; especially
for larger properties and for properties that are more detached. In other words,
rental sector user costs of housing capital increase with property size faster than
owner-occupied user costs.
2. Location is unimportant for the likelihood of being owner-occupied after con-
trolling for physical characteristics. Rent-to-price ratios vary significantly with
location most likely because changing locations leads to variation in the value of
the property that does not imply changes in gross maintenance levels. Some fea-
tures of the rent-to-price patterns are unstable over time which may reflect time
and location dependent expectations of capital gains. These facts are all consistent
with a theory of selection based on the physical character of the house.
3. Modeling and measuring differences in unobserved quality is essential for un-
derstanding which homes become rentals and at what price. The selection of
1Throughout we refer to these costs as maintenance costs. They are the costs required to keep a
property at constant quality.
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properties into owner-occupancy has a strong effect on the relative distribution of
both observed and unobserved characteristics in the two markets. In particular,
we find that the data reject uni-dimensional models of unobserved quality and
that selection affects the distributions of the different dimensions of quality dif-
ferently. Attributes of a dwelling that are unobserved in our data include features
like the layout of the dwelling, the architectural style, whether it has South facing
windows, whether it has a high quality kitchen or if there’s a garden that requires
upkeep. Unobserved quality that raises the value of owner-occupied houses is
valued equally by landlords; so this dimension of quality does not lead to selec-
tion between the two sectors. In contrast, the type of unobserved quality that
only raises rents but not values (“rental quality”) is on average lower in the rental
sector. Thus rentals have lower unobserved rental quality on average. This is
consistent with some unobservable attributes being harder to contract upon for
landlords and thus having higher maintenance costs in the rental sector. A further
implication is that rent-to-price measures based only on observable attributes that
do not control for selection are biased.
1.1 Relation to the literature
There is an extensive household tenure-choice literature that studies demand side se-
lection into homeownership. For example, see Rosen (1979), Goodman (1988), Kan
(2000), or Campbell and Cocco (2007). This literature studies how observable and un-
observable household factors affect selection into and welfare from homeownership.
For instance, Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) and Blow and Nesheim (2009) examine
how the flow shadow price of housing for owner-occupiers can differ systematically
from the cost of renting a similar housing unit in large part due to differences in the
Lagrange multipliers from households’ constrained maximization problems. In gen-
eral, the multipliers are functions of households’ current assets, income and other state
variables.
In contrast, in this paper we study supply side selection into homeownership. We
study what aspects of housing units explain why some units are more likely to end up
in the rental sector while others are more likely to end up in the owner-occupied sector.
Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) and Amior and Halket (2014) observe that there is a strik-
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ing difference in the homeownership rates of single versus multi-family housing units
throughout the US. This leads the former to note that “homeownership is particularly
correlated with housing structure.” Here we show that the same is true in England and
that this correlation is found consistently across many structural characteristics includ-
ing dwelling type, dwelling size and unobserved quality.
What explains this correlation? The technology that provides housing services is the
same regardless of housing sector: in both sectors, a physical housing unit provides the
services. However, it has long been suggested that the contracts that govern the provi-
sion of housing services in the rental and owner-occupied markets may be constrained
by tenure-dependent information frictions. A literature going back to Sweeney (1974)
and Henderson and Ioannides (1983) has argued that contracting frictions in the rental
sector result in higher maintenance costs and less upkeep and investment. Because of
monitoring costs, tenants under-invest in maintenance resulting in a higher depreciation
rate in the rental sector. In this literature, it is assumed but often unstated that these dif-
ferential costs are likely to be correlated with the physical characteristics of the property.
As a result, a housing unit with higher rental-specific maintenance costs, or for which
rental contracting frictions are greater, is more likely to be found in the owner-occupied
sector.
Heretofore, empirical support for these theories is scant.2 In the corporate finance
literature, studies of selection due to various contracting frictions and the effects of
selection on the distribution of observed returns are common.3 In the housing litera-
ture, despite the long-standing theories discussed above and the cautionary warning in
Glaeser and Gyourko (2007), there are no studies that control for supply side selec-
tion when estimating hedonic rent and price functions. The closest perhaps is Heston
and Nakamura (2009) which uses a small sample of federal employee data in several
small markets to show that owner-occupied housing units are 15 percent more valuable
2Linneman (1985) notes that the “efficiency” of landlord provided housing services is an important
factor determining ownership rates. Casas-Arce and Saiz (2010) examine how different jurisdictions’
legal systems and propensity to enforce contracts affect ownership propensities. Hanson (2012) looks at
how the mortgage interest tax deduction interacts with home sizes to affect ownership rates in the US.
Hilber (2005) examines neighborhood externality risks in the AHS and finds that they are negatively
correlated with homeownership. Coulson and Fisher (2014) study how property size affects a building’s
management structure. Harding et al. (2000) find that homeowners that are more likely to default on their
mortgage may under-maintain their house.
3Among many others, see Prabhala (2008).
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than observably equivalent rentals. The result is based on self-reported estimates of
rental flows obtained from owner-occupiers. We are the first to (a) estimate a selection
model of hedonic housing prices and rents for a large housing market (in our case, the
Greater London housing market), (b) to estimate the importance of unobserved quality
in this market, (c) to analyze the implications of these models for sector specific user
costs. Furthermore, we use repeated cross-sections sampled from periods of both hous-
ing price decline and boom in England and find that the estimated relationship between
physical attributes, selection and rent-to-price remains very stable. We find that recent
movements in the rent-to-price ratios of housing are reflected entirely in the value of
land,4 which is consistent with the methods and findings in Davis and Heathcote (2007),
Davis and Palumbo (2008), and Amior and Halket (2014).
Taking this one step further, if we assume that a single risk-adjusted discount rate
prices all housing in the market as in Epple et al. (2013), then we can say more. In this
case, if different housing units have different rent-to-price ratios, then these differences
must be due either to differing expectations about the future or to differences in the costs
of renting out the property. We argue that expectations about the future, given rents and
prices, should not systematically affect selection into renting. This enables us to use
our selection model results to estimate the potential size of the moral hazard problem
described above.
Our findings have important implications for macro models of the housing market.
As we stated at the outset, homeownership is a puzzle. To explain the high market share
of homeownership, many theories of household demand for homeownership incorporate
higher maintenance costs for rentals and a limited supply of “high value” rentals into
their models (e.g. Chambers et al., 2009b,a; Chen, 2010). Often these two elements
are the primary factors that explain why so many households choose to own in these
models. We show that selection due to agency problems can simultaneously explain
both the higher maintenance costs and the limited supply of physically valuable rentals.
Our estimate of the size of the agency problem is large but consistent with the less direct
estimates from these models.
Finally, accounting for unobserved quality explains two curious features in the raw
data. Firstly, direct measures of maintenance expenditures rarely show a meaningful
4One possible exception to this is in the 2014 wave rental sector findings. In that year, it appears that
the rent function, as a function of property size may be flatter than in other years.
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difference between rentals and owner-occupied properties.5 Our findings on bias and
selection imply that comparisons across tenure of observationally similar housing units
will not necessarily reveal evidence of contracting problems. Properties with more con-
tracting issues select into owner-occupancy. We show that not properly accounting for
selection leads to biased measures of the difference in maintenance costs that are large
enough to obscure the agency costs. Indeed, under some assumptions about interest
rates and capital gains, our estimates suggest (as an upper bound) that contracting prob-
lems can increase maintenance costs of large rental properties by as much as 50 percent.
Secondly, several studies (see Verbrugge, 2008; Landvoigt et al., Forthcoming; Ep-
ple et al., 2013; Verbrugge and Poole, 2010; Heston and Nakamura, 2009) using US data
have found that rent-to-price ratios decline with property prices. If we estimate rent and
price functions using UK data without accounting for selection, we also find that rent-
to-price ratios decline with property prices. The more expensive a property is, the lower
is its predicted rent-to-price ratio. As ownership rates are (unconditionally) increasing
in dwelling prices, this could lead one to the curious conclusion that households tend to
own homes that have low rent-to-price ratios. This is a bit puzzling from the household’s
perspective. Here we show that this unconditional correlation between ownership and
rent-to-price ratios breaks down once one controls for selection. Households actually
tend to own housing units whose physical characteristics imply high rent-to-price ratios.
Sections 2 and 3 introduce the model and data, respectively. Section 4 explains our
estimation procedure and Section 5 discusses the results.
2 Model
A property has observed characteristics z ∈ Rn and unobserved characteristics ε ∈ R2.
Observed characteristics include location, type of dwelling (detached, semi-detached,
5Differences between rental and owner-occupied maintenance expenditures in national accounts data
are small. There are several studies that attempt to measure at the disaggregate level whether rentals
have higher maintenance costs. Their findings are mixed. Galster (1983) estimates that owner-occupiers
occupy better properties and better maintain them. Shilling et al. (1991) estimates a hedonic model of
sales prices for rental and owner-occupied single-family property in a single parish in Louisiana and finds
that rentals depreciate faster. Malpezzi et al. (1987) estimates hedonic models of rents and prices from
the AHS and finds that rents decline evenly with age whereas prices decline at a declining rate. However,
Gatzlaff et al. (1998) finds limited evidence of differential maintenance by comparing appreciation rates
of rentals and owner-occupied housing units.
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etc.), size (square meters), number of bedrooms, and age of structure. We assume that
the value of unobserved characteristics is completely captured by a two dimensional
vector that we label “unobserved quality”. This vector has dimension of at least two
because selection into the owner-occupied sector is not perfectly correlated with prices.
In addition, a priori, it seems likely that some characteristics are more valued in the
rental sector while others are more valued in the owner-occupied sector.
If a dwelling unit is in the rental sector, its rent is observed. If it is in the owner-
occupied sector, its price is observed. Let log annual rent be given by
lnR(z,ε) = αz+λ r1ε1 +λ
r
2ε2. (1)
This is a log linear approximation to the true hedonic rent function. The parameters
(α,λ r1 ,λ
r
2) measure the percentage impact of observed and unobserved quality on rental
prices. Let the log price in the owner-occupied sector be
lnpio(z,ε) = β z+λ o1 ε1 +λ
o
2 ε2. (2)
This is a log linear approximation to the hedonic price function. The parameters (β ,λ o1 ,λ
o
2 )
capture the percentage impact of observed and unobserved quality on prices in the
owner-occupied sector.
Let the log price of a dwelling in the rental sector be
lnpir(z,ε) = (β − γ)z+(λ o1 −λ s1)ε1 +(λ o2 −λ s2)ε2. (3)
The parameters
(
γ,λ s1,λ
s
2
)
, when they are positive, capture the reduced form net loss in
value of renting out a dwelling relative to selling it in the owner-occupied sector. When
they are negative, they capture the net gain from renting the dwelling in the rental sector.
We discuss how rental prices are related to rents in Section 2.1 below.
We do not observe the rental sector price pir for any property in our data. However,
assuming investors maximise profits, a housing unit is observed in the owner-occupied
sector if
lnpio(z,ε)≥ lnpir(z,ε). (4)
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That is, if
γz ≥ −λ s1ε1−λ s2ε2 (5)
The prices pio and pir are conditioned on sector. They measure willingness to pay of
buyers in each sector. The unconditional price of a property is the price of the property
in the market where it is most valuable. That is,
P(z,ε) = max
{own,rent}
{pio(z,ε),pir(z,ε)}
The parameters of the price and rent functions may vary over time. We leave their
dependence on t implicit.
Under the assumption that ε ∼ N (0,Σ) and that ε is independent of z, this is a
standard Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979). Define
Λ=
 λ
r
1 λ
r
2
λ o1 λ
o
2
−λ s1 −λ s2
 .
The parameters (Σ,Λ) are not identified. Instead, we define η =Λε and seek to estimate
the parameters (α,β ,γ) and Ω = ΛΣΛT where Ω is the covariance matrix of η , with
matrix elements ωi j. Note that η ∈ R3, but since ε ∈ R2 by assumption, Ω is not full
rank. η1 is the error in the rent equation, η2 is the error in the owner-occupied price
equation, and η3 is the error in the selection equation.
Our data on prices, rents and allocations do not fully identify Ω. As usual with
discrete choice models, the variance parameter ω33 is not identified. In addition, ω12
is not identified. However, we can identify (α,β ) as well as
(
γ˜,Ω˜
)
(excluding ω˜12)
where the latter parameters are rescaled by the variance of η3 (ω33).
For much of the analysis below, the rescaling plays no role. However, the rescaling
does play an important role in the analysis of user costs, yields, and contracting costs
in Section 5.4. For these parts of the analysis, we estimate ω33 by fitting the predicted
rental sector yields from the model to data on rental sector yields in Bracke (2015). We
discuss this further in Section 5.4.
The model has several important features. First, the value of unobserved character-
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istics in the owner-occupied sector is not restricted to be perfectly correlated with the
value in the rental sector. Second, the impact of unobserved characteristics on selec-
tion is not restricted to be perfectly correlated with owner-occupied price nor with rents.
Third, the correlation of η3 and η2 may differ from the correlation between η3 and η1.
We can identify the variance of η1 and the variance of η2. We can also identify the
correlation of η1 and η3. We cannot identify the correlation of η1 and η2. However, we
show in Appendix A that because Ω˜ is rank 2, it can take on only two possible values.
2.1 User costs and the rent-to-price ratio
A hypothetical investor’s willingness to pay for a property in a sector, either pio (z,ε)
or pir (z,ε), equals the stream of utility or rent flows from the property discounted by
the sector-specific user cost of capital. The user cost of capital in a sector is determined
by the effective rate of interest, the cost of maintenance and expectations about future
capital gains, taking into account taxes, transactions costs, inflation, and uncertainty.
We assume that these relationships can be characterized by two Poterba-like user cost
equations (Poterba, 1992):
pio (z,ε) =
u(z,ε)
ro(z,ε)+ co (z,ε)−go(z,ε) (6)
pir (z,ε) =
R(z,ε)
rr(z,ε)+ cr (z,ε)−gr(z,ε) (7)
where for each sector i, ri(z,ε) is the effective discount rate, ci(z,ε) is the cost of man-
agement and maintenance (including amortized vacancy costs), and gi(z,ε) is expected
capital gains. u(z,ε) is the utility flow for an owner-occupier.
Each element in these equations may vary both across property types and sector.
Since tax policies and borrowing constraints frequently depend on tenure, there need
not be a single discount rate that prices all property in equilibrium. For example, mort-
gage interest payments are not deductible from taxable income in England for owner-
occupiers but are for landlords. This may be reflected in differences between ro and rr.
Capital gains are not taxed for owner-occupiers but are taxed for landlords. We assume
this is subsumed in differences between go and gr. Lettings are exempt from Value
Added Taxes in the UK but net rental income may be subject to income taxes. Assum-
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ing a common income tax rate, this can be subsumed into cr(z,ε). Costs of vacancies in
either sector can also be subsumed in ci.
In general, for a property of type (z,ε), user costs in the two sectors will differ.
Properties with relatively high rental sector user costs will be selected into the owner-
occupied sector. Owners of inframarginal properties will not be indifferent between
the two sectors. For inframarginal owners in the owner-occupied sector, P(z,ε) =
pio (z,ε) > pir (z,ε) while for inframarginal rental sector owners P(z,ε) = pir (z,ε) >
pio (z,ε). Only for owners of those properties at the margin, where P(z,ε) = pio(z,ε) =
pir(z,ε), do the two user cost equations (6)-(7) collapse to the more familiar, single
equation user cost formula (such as the one in Poterba (1992)).
In the next two sections we discuss the data and estimation results. Then in Sec-
tion 5, after discussing estimates of (pio,R,pir) and of selection of properties into the
two sectors, we discuss the extent to which the estimates are consistent with different
assumptions about how (ri,gi,ci) vary across properties and across the two sectors.
3 Data
We use data from the “secure access” version of waves 2011-2014 of the English Hous-
ing Survey (EHS). The EHS uses a complex multistage methodology. Each wave com-
prises two surveys which are then combined to produce two samples. Each sample is
constructed using data from surveys from multiple waves.
In each wave, the EHS team conducted a “household survey” and a “physical sur-
vey”. For example, to construct the 2011 wave, the EHS team sampled approximately
17,500 households in the financial year 2008/2009 (April 2008 - March 2009). These
households were drawn from the list of addresses held by Royal Mail.6
Respondents from this selection (approximately 17,000) comprised the household
interview sample. The EHS team then chose a subsample of these dwellings (approx-
imately 8,000 in 2008/2009), including vacant ones, and performed a physical inspec-
tion. This is called the “physical survey.” The subsample was constructed from the
17,500 by including all social housing7 addresses and taking a subsample of private
6At each sampled address, one dwelling was sampled. At each dwelling, one household was sampled.
7Social housing units are non-market rate rentals where the government either directly owns the
properties or offers subsidies to landlords in the sector.
11
addresses. Private rental properties were over-sampled. Finally, to construct the final
“housing stock” sample, the EHS team combined data from two physical surveys. For
instance, the housing stock sample in the 2011 wave is comprised of the physical sur-
veys from 2008/2009 and 2009/2010. Weighting for the final sample is based on this
two year sampling window.
We focus discussion on the 2011 wave of the EHS. While we also analyze the 2012,
2013, and 2014 waves, these later waves have some limitations. In the later waves,
property prices were top-coded at £1,000,000. Also, due to budget cuts, the later waves
used smaller samples and collected information on a smaller range of topics. Despite
these limitations, our results are robust across waves.8
Property prices recorded in the survey were obtained in one of two ways. For a
subset of the owner-occupied properties, owners self-reported what they thought the
market value of their home was. For the remainder of owner-occupied properties, a
professional surveyor valued the property on-site. We obtain results similar to those
reported below even if we restrict our sample of owner-occupied properties to either
subset. Rental sector rents were self-reported by tenants.
Much of our analysis focuses on a subsample of dwellings within 140 km of Trafal-
gar Square in London. We call this region "Greater London." We restrict the analysis to
this region because we want to focus on a single economic market.
We present summary statistics for the owner-occupied, private rental and social
housing sectors. However, when we estimate the model, we restrict the analysis to
private sector housing. Determinants of housing supply in the private sector are very
different from those in the social housing sector. In the private sector, investors may
buy and sell properties freely and prices are determined by the market. In the social
sector, supply is largely determined by political forces, not by choices of investors. In
addition, prices in this sector are subsidised and highly regulated.
Table 1 displays the overall market shares of owner-occupied housing, private rentals,
and publicly assisted housing in England and Greater London. In England in 2008-2010,
67.9% of housing units were owner-occupied units while 14.3% were private rentals
and 17.8% were publicly assisted units. In England, publicly assisted housing consists
of Local Authority provided housing (LA) and housing provided by registered social
8Because the samples in each wave use data from a two year span, the samples overlap. For instance,
the samples in the 2011 and 2012 waves each use the same data collected in 2009/2010.
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landlords (RSL).9The Greater London area is roughly similar to the entire country with
regards to tenure: there are slightly more private rentals and fewer owner-occupiers in
London. The share of private rentals has increased by three percentage points over the
four waves at the expense of owner-occupancy.
Table 1: Market shares: Greater London and England (%)
Region EHS Wave Owner-occupied Private rented LA or RSL
London
2011 66.6 15.7 17.7
2012 65.3 17.0 17.8
2013 63.1 18.7 18.1
2014 62.4 19.5 18.2
England
2011 67.9 14.3 17.8
2012 67.0 15.1 17.9
2013 65.3 16.4 18.3
2014 65.0 17.1 17.9
Note: Market shares are computed using sampling weights for each wave.
London refers to the Greater London sample area. The 2011 wave uses data
from April 2008 - March 2010. The 2012 wave uses data from April 2009 -
March 2011. The 2013 wave uses data from April 2010 - March 2012. The
2014 wave uses data from April 2011 - March 2013.
Table 2 shows how market shares vary with distance from the center of London.
Within 10 km of the center, the owner-occupied share is 37.9% while the private rented
and social housing shares are 23.7% and 38.4% respectively. The owner-occupied share
increases with distance. More than 50 km from the center, the owner-occupied share
is 72.9% while the rental and social housing shares decline to 13.4% and 13.7% re-
spectively. We will see that these patterns with respect to distance do not persist after
controlling for structural characteristics.
9RSL’s are non-profit organizations that provide low-cost housing. They are regulated by the govern-
ment and highly subsidized.
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Table 2: Market share by distance: Greater London 2011 wave (%)
Distance Owner-occupied Private rented LA or RSL
Less than 10 km 37.9 23.7 38.4
10 - 20 km 61.6 19.8 18.6
20 - 30 km 69.8 13.5 16.8
30 - 50 km 71.4 13.1 15.5
More than 50 km 72.9 13.4 13.7
Note: Market shares are calculated using data and sampling weights from the
2011 wave of the EHS. The 2011 wave uses data from April 2008 - March
2010.
Tables 3 and 4 show how market shares vary with size and dwelling type. Large
properties, semi-detached and detached houses and bungalows are much more likely to
be in the owner-occupied sector while small properties, converted flats and dwellings
in multi-unit structures are more likely to be in the rental sector. We will see that these
patterns hold up even after controlling for location and other property characteristics.
However, they cannot be explained by relative prices in the two sectors.
Table 3: Market share by dwelling size: Greater London 2011 wave (%)
Dwelling size Owner-occupied Private rented LA or RSL
Less than 50 sq. m. 33.1 27.4 39.5
50 - 60 sq. m. 47.5 25.4 27.2
60 - 80 sq. m 60.3 17.1 22.6
80 - 100 sq. m. 74.6 12.6 12.8
More than 100 sq. m. 90.1 7.24 2.63
Note: Market shares are calculated using data and sampling weights from the 2011
wave of the EHS. The 2011 wave uses data from April 2008 - March 2010.
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Table 4: Market share by dwelling type: Greater London 2011 wave (%)
Dwelling Type Owner-occupied Private rented LA or RSL
Semi detached 73.9 13.0 13.7
Detached 94.4 5.0 0.40
Bungalow 76.8 5.0 18.3
Converted flat 39.3 48.5 15.2
Low rise 32.2 26.7 38.4
High rise 20.7 19.7 48.1
Note: Market shares are calculated using data and sampling weights from
the 2011 wave of the EHS. The 2011 wave uses data from April 2008 -
March 2010. The semi-detached category includes “End Terrace" and “Mid
Terrace".
4 Estimation procedure
We estimate the model parameters from equations (1), (2), and (5) using maximum
likelihood. As noted above, the parameters γ˜ and Ω˜ are normalized so that ω˜33 = 1. For
much of the analysis below, this normalization does not matter. However, in Section 5.4
where we discuss estimation of user costs, we do require an estimate of ω33. Hence, in
Section 5.4 we use additional information on rental sector yields from Bracke (2013) to
estimate ω33.
We explore several specifications. In the main specification, we include indicator
variables for dwelling type and dwelling age10, an eighth-order polynomial in dwelling
size (square meters), and a set of variables that account for the dwelling’s geographic
location. For owner-occupied properties, we also include an indicator for whether the
property price is self-reported or not.
The confidential version of the EHS reports each dwelling’s full postcode. We match
each postcode with its geographic coordinates using the Office for National Statistics’s
Postcode Directory for 2013. Because postcodes can change over time, there are a few
unmatched postcodes. In 2014, there is 1 unmatched owner-occupied property out of
10Dwelling types are detailed in Table 3. Dwelling age categories include: 1) pre-1919, 2) 1919 to
1944, 3) 1945 to 1964, 4) 1965 to 1980 or 5) post 1980.
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5,184 and 2 unmatched private rentals out of 2,683 for all of England. In 2011, there
are none. The numbers of unmatched properties for other waves are similar. For these
unmatched properties, we imputed coordinates using the mean geographic coordinates
of all postcodes sharing the same postcode district (postcodes are grouped geographi-
cally and the first three to four characters of a 7-8 character postcode are its postcode
district). For each property, we then convert its geographic coordinates to polar coor-
dinates (r,θ) centered around Trafalgar square. For each property we compute r, the
Euclidean distance from Trafalgar Square and θ , the angular distance from due east
measured in radians. That is, θ = 0, is east, θ = 0.5pi is south, etc.
In our empirical model, we model location effects as a nonparametric function of
(r,θ). In the main specification, we include the interaction of an eighth-order polyno-
mial in distance with a fifth order trigonometric expansion in terms of θ . The distance
variable captures the impact of distance from London on property prices and on selec-
tion into the owner-occupied sector. The angular distance variable θ captures variation
in outcomes that depends on direction of travel. For example, the rate of decline of
prices with distance is higher heading west than east. In a second specification, we drop
the angular distance variable in order to measure the average effect of distance. We
also explore including indicator variables for the numbers of bedrooms, kitchens, living
rooms and bathrooms as well as using levels rather than logs of prices and rents. Re-
sults for these additional specifications are available from the authors upon request. For
all cases, the sample is private rental and owner-occupied housing units within Greater
London, using the sample weights provided in the EHS.
5 Results
Parameter estimates for the main specification are detailed in Table 5. Most of the
parameters are statistically significant and have plausible values. Because the parame-
ters are difficult to interpret we plot predicted values of log rent, log price and owner-
occupied market share as functions of individual explanatory variables while holding
other property characteristics fixed at baseline values. The baseline house is a semi-
detached house with 75 square meters of floor space, 10 km Northwest of Trafalgar
Square, built between 1919-1944. We also plot point-wise confidence bands for the
predictions. The graphs are discussed below.
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5.1 Location
The upper left panel of Figure 1 shows how prices and rents decline with distance condi-
tional on moving Northwest from the centre. Pointwise confidence bands are illustrated
with shaded areas. The decline of property prices and rents with distance is dramatic.
The panel shows that an owner-occupied property 20 km from the center of London is
worth only 30% of an identical property at the center. For the same change in distance,
rent in the rental sector declines to 37% of the rent at the centre. For the first 10 km,
owner-occupied properties decline in price about 10% per km. Rental properties rents
decline by about 8% per km. In both sectors, the hedonic functions flatten out signifi-
cantly at distances greater than 10 km. In the owner-occupied sector, moving from 10
km to 20 km reduces property prices by about 2.0% per km and from 20 km to 40 km by
about 1.0% per km. For rental properties, moving from 10 km to 20 km reduces rents
by 1.0% per km and from 20 km to 40 km reduces rents by 0.5% per km.
The other panels in Figure 1 show a very similar pattern for three other directions,
Northeast, Southwest and Southeast. Regardless of direction, the qualitative pattern is
the same. Both prices and rents fall dramatically, prices fall faster than rents, and the
functions flatten out after about 20 km and even more after 40 km. The function is flatter
in the other directions and is almost completely flat after 40 km. In some directions (e.g.
Southeast and Northeast), 140 km from Trafalgar Square is a point in the middle of the
sea. Thus the confidence intervals in those directions blow up. In these cases, the
estimated hedonic price function should be interpreted as a prediction for what the price
of a property would be if it was feasible to fill in the sea and build new housing.
These results are obtained without controlling for lot size. Our data do not include
information on lot size. This likely biases upward (towards zero) the estimated slopes
of the hedonic rent and price functions with respect to distance. Lot sizes are probably
larger further away from the city center where land is cheaper.
Figure 2 shows the estimated relationship between distance and the owner-occupancy
rate moving Northwest from London. The “unconditional” line plots the estimated re-
lationship between distance and ownership when no other correlates are included. The
curve reproduces the numbers in Table 211. The “conditional” line plots the relationship
11The “unconditional” line differs from the those in Table 2 only because the former is the homeown-
ership rate for houses not in the LA/RSL.
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with distance holding other characteristics fixed at their baseline values. Unsurpris-
ingly, the unconditional line shows that owner-occupancy is far more prevalent 20 km
outside of London than inside the city center. However, the conditional line shows that,
once one controls for other housing unit characteristics, distance essentially plays no
role in selection into owner-occupancy. Owner-occupancy as a function of distance is
essentially flat at around 80%.
In summary, both rents and prices fall with distance. Rents relative to prices rise
with distance but housing units are not more likely to be found in the rental sector. Why
then don’t investors in properties far from the centre convert more properties into rental
units? We use equations (5) and (7) to frame an answer.
One possible explanation is that maintenance costs relative to rents rise as the value
of the location falls. This point is best illustrated by thinking of the value of a property as
being composed of the value of land and the value of built structure. In general, structure
requires far more maintenance than land. So, maintenance costs are increasing in the
proportion of the value that is structural. Given that the value of land decreases quickly
as distance increases, the proportion of value that is structural increases with distance. A
second possible explanation is that vacancy costs in the rental sector are higher further
out because the rental markets there are thinner resulting in longer expected vacancy
durations. A third possible explanation is that properties close to the city center had
higher expected capital gains during the period of our study. In any case, no matter
the cause, our results indicate that the relative value of a house on the two sectors (pir
versus pio) is not affected; the higher costs or lower expected capital gains of suburban
properties is capitalized into rents.
Some limited evidence on these points can be obtained by studying changes in the
hedonic functions over time. Figure 3 shows estimated hedonic prices and rents with
respect to distance for all four waves of the EHS, 2011-2014. The functions become
steeper over time and the rent-to-price ratio is unstable. In the most recent wave, 2014,
the rental function is steeper with respect to distance than the price function, the oppo-
site of the earlier waves. These facts suggest that perhaps (a) expected capital gains are
location-dependent and (b) these relative difference across locations may change at a
high frequency. Though we do not have good data on household expectations by loca-
tion, it is at least true that ex-post capital gains have varied widely over this same time
period. For example, UK Land Registry data that show that, from 2009 to 2014, prop-
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erty prices within 10km of London increased 42% while prices further out increased
only by 22%.12
5.2 Structure
5.2.1 Size
Figure 4 (left panel) shows how rents and prices change with respect to the total floor
space of the property. Property prices increase 7.3% per 10 square meters. Rents in-
crease 10.5% per 10 square meters. As a result, rent-to-price ratios increase with size.
Figure 6 shows that this pattern remains stable over time. Other than for rents in the
2014 wave, most of parameter estimates measuring the impact of dwelling type and size
are stable over time, whereas the impact of location on prices and rents (but not selec-
tion) is less stable. Therefore most of the medium to high frequency variation in prices
and rents over time in our data is captured by changes in the value of location (i.e. land)
and not in the valuation of dwelling type or size, consistent with findings throughout the
housing literature (Davis and Heathcote (2007); Davis and Palumbo (2008); Amior and
Halket (2014)).
The top right panel of Figure 4 shows how size affects the probability of being
owner-occupied. Again, we compare the results from the selection model to an “un-
conditional” probit of ownership on size. The effects are dramatic. Unlike location and
like dwelling type, size is hugely important for explaining variation in selection, even
after controlling for other covariates. The market share of the owner-occupied sector
increases from less than 60% for properties less than 50 square meters to more than
90% for properties larger than 150 square meters.
5.2.2 Dwelling type
Figure 5 shows how prices, rents and ownership vary with structure type. Property
prices for detached houses and bungalows are about 22% higher than for semi-detached
houses whereas converted flats and dwellings in low-rise units are about 20-22% cheaper.
Rents follow a similar pattern. Rents for detached houses and bungalows are about 24%
more expensive than semi-detached properties. The rent-to-price ratio is approximately
12Further details on these calculations are available from the authors upon request.
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constant across the categories of semi-detached, detached and bungalows. For dwellings
in multi-unit structures, rents are 33% lower than semi-detached properties. So, the rent-
to-price ratio for multi-unit structures is much lower than for detached or semi-detached.
These results are stable over waves.13
In contrast to location, the conditional relationship between dwelling type and pre-
dicted ownership is qualitatively similar to the unconditional relationship. The uncon-
ditional relationship is detailed in Table 4. Excluding the social housing sector, 95% of
detached, 85% of semi-detached properties and 93.9% of bungalows are in the owner-
occupied sector while various types of dwellings in multi-unit structures (converted
flats, low rise and high rise) have ownership rates that vary between 44.8% and 54.7%.
Physical features are important determinants of selection into the owner-occupied sec-
tor. Figure 5 shows that conditional on location and other characteristics, the average
predicted ownership rate is between 80% and 90% for semi-detached, detached and
bungalows and falls to around 60% for dwellings in multi-unit structures.
The pattern is similar to the stylized fact documented in Glaeser and Shapiro (2003)
that in the US, housing units in multi-unit structures are extremely likely to be rented
(85.9% in their study) whereas single-unit housing is very likely to be owned (85.5%
in their study). Unconditional ownership rates do not vary quite as much in England
across structure types (this is true even in the full sample). Conditioning narrows the
difference still further.
In England property ownership predominantly takes one of two forms, freehold or
leasehold. Freehold ownership is ownership in perpetuity. Leasehold ownership is own-
ership of a long lease (for example 75 years or 99 years).14 It is clear that property
prices should depend on the freehold or leasehold status of the property. Unfortunately
the EHS only records information on the type of holding for owner-occupied proper-
ties. For the Greater London subsample, leaseholds comprise only 10 percent of owner-
occupied properties. In addition, holding type is highly correlated with dwelling type.
In the EHS sample, fewer than 23% of flats are freeholds while nearly 94% of detached
houses are freeholds. Giglio et al. (2015) finds that leasehold flats sell for a noticeable
duration-dependent discount compared to otherwise identical freeholds. So, some of
13Results from other waves on dwelling type as well as other unreported results are available upon
request.
14A third form of ownership, “commonhold”, exists but is almost never used due to legal uncertainties.
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the decline in prices that is captured by dwelling type may in fact be due to the higher
prevalence of leaseholds for flats. However they also find that the type of holding does
not affect rents. So the decline in rent-to-price ratios for flats is likely understated by
omitting holding type. When an indicator for ownership type is included in the prop-
erty price equation, the parameter estimate is 0.1198 (with a standard error of 0.0447).
Freehold status increases property prices nearly 12% relative to leasehold status. The
estimates in Figure 5 are robust to including an indicator for leasehold in our estimation
of equation (2).
5.3 Unobserved quality
The final two columns of Table 5 report estimates of the error correlations from the
selection model. For the rental sector results, the correlation between η1 and η3 is
−0.9759 (0.0048). Properties that are likely to be in the rental sector (high η3) have
much lower unobserved rental quality (η1). For the owner-occupied sector, the correla-
tion between η2 and η3 is only 0.1040 (0.0533). It is not statistically distinct from zero
at the 5% level. Selection into the owner-occupied sector has zero or low correlation
with unobserved owner-occupied quality (η2).
The implication of this is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 4. The figure
shows, for an average housing unit, how the predicted average unobserved owner-
occupied quality (η2) and rental quality (η1) vary with size. Conditional on being in the
owner-occupied sector, average unobserved owner-occupied quality does not vary with
size. However, this is not true in the rental sector. Conditional on being in the rental
sector, bigger dwellings have much lower unobserved rental quality. The average rental
quality difference between a 50 square meter rental property and a 100 square meter
rental property is almost 22%. Large housing units in the rental sector are likely to be
of much lower unobserved rental quality.
Characteristics that are unobservable to econometricians may suffer more acutely
from third-party verification problems. Enforcing contracts to invest in and/or maintain
these characteristics may be particularly costly, if possible at all. Landlords may there-
fore choose properties with fewer of these characteristics.15 With this in mind, one way
15Kanemoto (1990) builds a theory of underinvestment in housing and security of tenure that has a
similar mechanism.
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to explain the results is as follows. Suppose λ r1 ,λ
o
2 ,λ
s
1 > 0 and λ
o
1 ,λ
s
2 = 0. In this case,
one could think of ε1 as an amenity that affects users’ enjoyment of a property but that
comes at a high maintenance cost. Such an amenity raises rents, is negatively correlated
with selection into the rental sector, and has zero net impact on property prices. The
high maintenance cost exactly offsets the use value. ε2 on the other hand could be an
amenity that affects both prices and rents but does not affect selection, perhaps because
there are no maintenance concerns associated with it. In other words, ε1 could be a
jacuzzi - nice to use but a nightmare to maintain, while ε2 could be the unimpeded light
from South facing windows.
Finally, some models of homeownership and housing demand use a preference spec-
ification which includes a preference for owning (a.k.a a “warm glow” from owning).16
In calibration exercises, such a preference for owning is often required to generate high
homeownership rates. Our results show that an econometrician measuring demand for
homeownership using only observable housing characteristics would indeed find a pref-
erence for owning. This is because rentals, on average, have lower unobserved rental
quality.
5.4 Implications for user cost and yields
To estimate the model, we rescaled γ and Ω by
√
ω33. Let η˜3 be the normalized error
term. We now derive formula for user costs and yields based on these parameters.
Let uo = u(z,ε)pio(z,ε) and u
r = R(z,ε)pir(z,ε) and recall that η = Λε. The variable u
r also is
the yield on a rental property (gross of maintenance expenses). If we assume that the
service flows from dwelling (z,ε) are the same regardless of which sector the dwelling
is in, then R(z,ε) = u(z,ε). Combining this with equations (1) - (3) implies that
lnuo = (α−β )z+η1−η2 (8)
lnur = (α−β +√ω33γ˜)z+η1−η2−
√
ω33η˜3. (9)
Both user costs and yields depend on the unknown parameter ω33. Since η is normally
16For example, see Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) or Kiyotaki et al. (2011).
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distributed, we can calculate the conditional mean rental sector yield as
E(ur |rental ) =
ˆ
z
E (ur |z, η˜3 ≥ γ˜z) f (z |rental )dz (10)
=
ˆ
z
1−Φ(γ˜z−Ψ12)
1−Φ(γ˜z) e
(α−β+√ω33γ˜)z+Ψ11 f (z |rental )dz
where Ψ12 = cov(η˜3,η1−η2 +√ω33η˜3) and Ψ11 = var (η1−η2 +√ω33η˜3).
Figure 3 in Bracke (2015), based on data on rents and prices for the UK buy-to-let
market, shows that the average rental sector yield in London in 2009-2014 was 0.062.
Matching this moment to equation (10) , we find ω33 ∈ {0.011,0.215}. There are two
possible values corresponding to the two possible values of ω˜12 derived in Appendix A.
Finally, equations (8) and (9) also imply that the ratio of user costs satisfies:
lnur− lnuo = γz−η3. (11)
In the following sections we discuss estimates of user costs for the same baseline
semi-detached house as above. We present results for two cases, ω33 = 0.215 and ω33 =
0.011.
5.4.1 Variation with respect to location
As discussed above, the rent-to-price ratio increases with distance in several waves but
decreases with distance in 2014. At the same time, location is unimportant for selection.
Using equation (11), these facts imply that differential users costs between the two
sectors do not vary much with distance. This can be seen in the top panels of Figures
8-9 which show average log user costs in the two sectors as a function of distance for
the two estimates of ω33. The two curves increase with distance but are nearly parallel.
For the high estimate of ω33, the gap between the two log user costs curves is 0.40 at
a distance of zero and 0.45 at a distance of 40 km.17 In other words, while effective
interest rates, maintenance costs, and expected capital gains, may vary with distance
from London, they do display significant differential variation across the two housing
17For the case ω33 = 0.011, the results are qualitatively similar. The difference in log user costs
increases from 0.09 to 0.10.
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sectors.18 As discussed in Section 5.1, it is likely that both rental and owner-occupied
maintenance costs as a proportion of value rise with distance. Apparently though, in
some time periods like those covered in the 2014 wave, this maintenance effect on the
rent-to-price ratio is dominated by other effects. That is, during this period either the
discount rate in London went up relative to outside London or relative expected capital
gains fell in London.
5.4.2 Variation with respect to structure
Above we found that the more detached and/or the larger a property is the higher is
its rent-to-price ratio but the lower is its likelihood of being a rental. Detachedness and
size are each positively valued and are each negatively correlated with being in the rental
sector. Considering equations (6) and (7), this implies that either r
o
rr or
co
cr decreases or
go
gr increases with detachedness or with size. The lower two panels in Figure 8 show
the resulting predictions for average log user costs as functions of size and dwelling
type in the two sectors. For the high estimate of ω33, user costs in the owner-occupied
sector increase from about 6.7% to 9.1% when moving from a 50 square meter property
to 110 square meters. For the same change in property size, rental sector user costs
rise from 8.2% to 14.2% of the price of the property. Similarly owner-occupied user
costs are 7.7% for detached dwellings vs. 5.3% for dwellings in high rise multi-unit
structures. Detached property rental sector user costs are 11.1% vs. 5.5% for flats in
high rise structures. There are large increases in relative rental sector user costs for
bigger properties and for more detached properties.19
What explains these increases? Is it likely that g
o
gr is dramatically different for de-
tached houses than for dwellings in multi-unit structures? Is this ratio likely to be dra-
matically different for 110 square meter flats versus 50 square meter flats? This ratio
may vary slightly with these physical features due to sectoral differences in taxation of
capital gains. For instance, capital gains below a certain threshold are tax exempt for
owner-occupiers. However, any variation due to differential tax treatments should also
18It seems unlikely that the individual factors vary differentially in such a way to cancel one another
out.
19If ω33 = 0.011, user-costs increase from 6.7% to 8.8% and 7% to 9.8% for owner-occupied and
rental houses, respectively, when size increases from 50 square meters to 110 square meters and they
decrease from 7.7% to 5.3% and 8.3% to 5.3% for owner-occupied and rental houses, respectively, when
the houses changes from a detached property to a high rise.
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be reflected in our findings with respect to location. This is not the case. Location is un-
correlated with ownership after controlling for observable and unobservable structural
characteristics. As discussed above, this suggests that even if expected capital gains
varies with location, g
o
gr is roughly constant.
In contrast, in the case of costs, it is theoretically plausible that rental costs cr in-
crease faster than co when size increases or when one compares detached houses to
dwellings in multi-unit structures. This is the direct or indirect implication of Galster
(1983), Henderson and Ioannides (1983) and Coulson and Fisher (2014). Our findings
suggest that this differential increase in costs is large. We compute an estimate of an
upper bound for this magnitude in Section 5.4.3.
In the case of interest costs, it is also theoretically plausible that interest costs in the
rental sector, mr, increase faster than mo. For instance, some property owners (either
landlords or owner-occupiers) may face tighter borrowing constraints than others. As
a result, they may face higher interest rates. It is possible that less constrained owner-
occupiers tend to live in physically more valuable housing units (but not locationally
more valuable housing units). In this case, the marginal owner-occupier’s discount rate
would decline with structure value. At the same time, if the marginal landlord’s discount
rate was independent of property characteristics, then mo/mr would decrease relative
to physical value. Our study does not provide direct evidence that can shed further
light on the extent to which this theoretical possibility is empirically relevant. Further
investigation is required to determine whether and to what degree mortgage costs vary
across owner-occupiers, across landlords, and across different types of housing units.
5.4.3 Implication for maintenance costs
Based on our above estimates, we can back out an estimate of how tenure affects main-
tenance costs for a property if we make additional assumptions about the discount rates
and expected capital gains. For instance, if we make the extreme assumption that
rr−gr = ro−go, equation (11) becomes:
1+ c
r
r−g
1+ c
o
r−g
= e
√
ω33γ˜z−√ω33η˜3.
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In Figures 10-11, we calibrate co = .017 (consistent with measures of owner-occupied
depreciation in Gatzlaff et al. (1998); Malpezzi et al. (1987); Amior and Halket (2014),
among others) and set r− g = 0.01 for both sectors. For each estimate of ω33, we
then plot the conditional and unconditional mean values of cr as functions of location,
size, and dwelling type. The conditional mean functions show the means conditional
on being either in the rental or the owner-occupied sector. The unconditional average,
E (cr), which measures the average cost of maintenance if all properties were rented, is
higher than co and increases faster with z. The conditional mean, E (cr |owner ), which
measures the counterfactual cost of maintaining owner-occupied properties were they
instead rented, is still higher. In contrast, the conditional mean, E (cr |rent ) is lower.
As one would expect, properties in the rental sector have lower average renter-specific
maintenance costs. This stems from the fact that these properties have lower unobserved
rental quality. These findings suggest why estimates of differential maintenance costs
that do not control for selection fail to find higher costs in the rental sector. They are not
comparing counterfactual maintenance costs. Conditional on the extreme assumptions
in this section, this shows that the moral hazard problem for landlords and tenants can
be very large.
5.5 Bias in imputed rents and/or prices
Beyond simply biasing estimates of maintenance costs, the estimation results imply that
hedonic estimates of rents and prices that do not control for selection are also biased.
For rents, these biases are statistically and economically significant. Moreover the bias
creates striking patterns in the data.
To illustrate the bias, we re-estimate α and β without controlling for selection. We
then use these biased estimates to predict rents and prices for all housing units in the
sample. Figure 12 plots the predicted rent-to-price ratios against the predicted log price
from the biased regressions for both rentals and owner-occupied properties. The bi-
ased estimates imply that homeownership rates are increasing in the predicted price of
a home even though the predicted rent-to-price ratio declines in the price of the home.
This is a common finding: Verbrugge (2008); Heston and Nakamura (2009); Verbrugge
and Poole (2010); Bracke (2013); Epple et al. (2013) all find that rent-to-price ratios de-
cline with prices while, similarly, Landvoigt et al. (Forthcoming) estimates that housing
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service flows rise less than one-for-one with property prices in the cross-section.20 The
relationships shown in Figure 12 and in these studies are puzzling from a certain angle
and are a challenge for models which attempt to explain the distribution of household
homeownership choices: why do so many households choose to buy expensive proper-
ties when seemingly equivalent rental properties are relatively cheap? Estimates from
our selection corrected model provide the answer: The rentals are not equivalent. More
expensive properties in the rental sector on average have lower unobserved quality.
Using parameter values from the biased regression results, Figure 13 (left, center
and right) plots the predicted prices and rents as functions of distance, size, and dwelling
type respectively. Comparing these figures to their counterparts from section 4 (Figures
1, 4, and 5 respectively), several facts are apparent. There is no bias in the hedonic esti-
mates with respect to location. However, the predicted relationships between rents and
physical characteristics - dwelling type and size - are biased. In fact, the relationship
between rent-to-price and price predicted by the biased estimates is negative whereas
the relationship predicted by the selection corrected model is positive. Using the biased
estimates, one would conclude that larger, detached homes (which are more expensive)
have lower rent-to-price ratios. The selection corrected model results show that the op-
posite is true. This dichotomy between location and structure was already evident from
our findings discussed above. These figures show how large the bias is: it qualitatively
reverses patterns. Correcting for the bias eliminates the puzzle raised by Figure 12.
6 Conclusion
Housing units are not randomly selected into a housing sector. Physical attributes in-
cluding some that are unobservable in our data are important for selection. Location
is not. These findings are consistent with theories of contracting frictions over mainte-
nance and upkeep of the property. Most existing models of households’ homeownership
decisions, such as Landvoigt et al. (Forthcoming); Cocco (2005); Diaz and Luengo-
Prado (2008); Henderson and Ioannides (1983), largely have abstracted away from ex-
plicit considerations of the multi-characteristic nature of housing units. To understand
the puzzles of homeownership, our findings point to a need to examine both sector-
20Halket and Pignatti (2014) shows that some of this co-variation can be explained by differences in
rental vacancy rates.
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specific housing costs as well as, on the demand side, to model household choices of
both ownership and housing characteristics. Perhaps, households that have a higher
demand for larger housing units or detached houses or housing units with high mainte-
nance amenities are more likely to save for a downpayment everything else equal.
The results also imply that properly accounting for the bias that selection imparts
may encourage refinements in the construction of price indices both for housing and
for consumer prices as well as national accounts. It may also help to better understand
some of the relative movements of rents and prices over time such as those documented
in Campbell et al. (2009).
References
AMIOR, M. AND J. HALKET (2014): “Do Households Use Homeownership To Insure
Themselves? Evidence Across U.S. Cities,” Quantitative Economics, 5.
BLOW, L. AND L. NESHEIM (2009): “Dynamic housing expenditures and household
welfare,” .
BRACKE, P. (2013): “House Prices and Rents: Micro Evidence from a Matched Dataset
in Central London,” SERC Discussion Papers 0127, Spatial Economics Research
Centre, LSE.
——— (2015): “How Much Do Investors Pay for Houses?” .
CAMPBELL, J. Y. AND J. F. COCCO (2007): “How do house prices affect consumption?
Evidence from micro data,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 591–621.
CAMPBELL, S. D., M. A. DAVIS, J. GALLIN, AND R. F. MARTIN (2009): “What
moves housing markets: A variance decomposition of the rent-price ratio,” Journal
of Urban Economics, 66, 90–102.
CASAS-ARCE, P. AND A. SAIZ (2010): “Owning versus Renting: Do Courts Matter?”
Journal of Law and Economics, 53, 137–165.
28
CHAMBERS, M., C. GARRIGA, AND D. SCHLAGENHAUF (2009a): “The Loan Struc-
ture and Housing Tenure Decisions in an Equilibrium Model of Mortgage Choice,”
Review of Economic Dynamics, 12, 444–468.
CHAMBERS, M., C. GARRIGA, AND D. E. SCHLAGENHAUF (2009b): “Accounting
For Changes In The Homeownership Rate,” International Economic Review, 50, 677–
726.
CHEN, K. (2010): “A Life-Cycle Analysis of Social Security with Housing,” Review of
Economic Dynamics, 13, 597–615.
COCCO, J. (2005): “Portfolio choice in the presence of housing,” Review of Financial
Studies, 18, 535–567.
COULSON, N. E. AND L. M. FISHER (2014): “Houses, apartments and condos: The
governance of multifamily housing,” Tech. rep., Penn State University.
DAVIS, M. A. AND J. HEATHCOTE (2007): “The Price and Quantity of Residential
Land in the United States,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 54, 2595–2620.
DAVIS, M. A. AND M. G. PALUMBO (2008): “The price of residential land in large
US cities,” Journal of Urban Economics, 63, 352–384.
DIAZ, A. AND M. J. LUENGO-PRADO (2008): “On the user cost and homeownership,”
Review of Economic Dynamics, 11, 584–613.
EPPLE, D., L. QUINTERO, AND H. SIEG (2013): “Estimating Hedonic Functions for
Rents and Values in the Presence of Unobserved Heterogeneity in the Quality for
Housing,” Tech. rep.
GALSTER, G. C. (1983): “Empirical Evidence on Cross-Tenure Differences in Home
Maintenance and Conditions,” Land Economics, 59, pp. 107–113.
GATZLAFF, D. H., R. K. GREEN, AND D. C. LING (1998): “Cross-Tenure Differences
in Home Maintenance and Appreciation,” Land Economics, 74, pp. 328–342.
GIGLIO, S., M. MAGGIORI, AND J. STROEBEL (2015): “Very Long-Run Discount
Rates,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130, 1–53.
29
GLAESER, E. L. AND J. GYOURKO (2007): “Arbitrage in Housing Markets,” NBER
Working Papers 13704, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
GLAESER, E. L. AND J. M. SHAPIRO (2003): “The Benefits of the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction,” in Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 17, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc, NBER Chapters, 37–82.
GOODMAN, A. C. (1988): “An econometric model of housing price, permanent in-
come, tenure choice, and housing demand,” Journal of Urban Economics, 23, 327 –
353.
HALKET, J. AND M. PIGNATTI (2014): “Homeownership and the Scarcity of Rentals,”
Tech. rep., University of Essex, Department of Economics.
HANSON, A. (2012): “Size of home, homeownership, and the mortgage interest deduc-
tion,” Journal of Housing Economics, 21, 195–210.
HARDING, J., T. J. MICELI, AND C. SIRMANS (2000): “Do Owners Take Better Care
of Their Housing Than Renters?” Real Estate Economics, 28, 663–681.
HECKMAN, J. J. (1979): “Sample selection bias as a specification error,” Economet-
rica: Journal of the econometric society, 153–161.
HENDERSON, J. V. AND Y. M. IOANNIDES (1983): “A model of housing tenure
choice,” American Economic Review, 73, 98–113.
HESTON, A. AND A. O. NAKAMURA (2009): “Questions about the equivalence of
market rents and user costs for owner occupied housing,” Journal of Housing Eco-
nomics, 18, 273 – 279.
HILBER, C. A. (2005): “Neighborhood externality risk and the homeownership status
of properties,” Journal of Urban Economics, 57, 213–241.
IACOVIELLO, M. AND M. PAVAN (2013): “Housing and debt over the life cycle and
over the business cycle,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 60, 221–238.
KAN, K. (2000): “Dynamic modeling of housing tenure choice,” Journal of Urban
Economics.
30
KANEMOTO, Y. (1990): “Contract types in the property market,” Regional Science and
Urban Economics, 20, 5–22.
KIYOTAKI, N., A. MICHAELIDES, AND K. NIKOLOV (2011): “Winners and Losers in
Housing Markets,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43, 255–296.
LANDVOIGT, T., M. PIAZZESI, AND M. SCHNEIDER (Forthcoming): “The Housing
Market(s) of San Diego,” American Economic Review.
LINNEMAN, P. (1985): “An economic analysis of the homeownership decision,” Jour-
nal of Urban Economics, 17, 230–246.
MALPEZZI, S., L. OZANNE, AND T. G. THIBODEAU (1987): “Microeconomic Esti-
mates of Housing Depreciation,” Land Economics, 63, 372–385.
POTERBA, J. M. (1992): “Taxation and Housing: Old Questions, New Answers,” Amer-
ican Economic Review, 82, 237–42.
PRABHALA, N. R. (2008): “Self-selection models in corporate finance,” Handbook of
Empirical Corporate Finance SET, 1, 37.
ROSEN, H. (1979): “Housing Decisions and the US Income Tax: An Econometric
Analysis,” Journal of Public Economics, 11, 1–24.
SHILLING, J. D., C. SIRMANS, AND J. F. DOMBROW (1991): “Measuring deprecia-
tion in single-family rental and owner-occupied housing,” Journal of Housing Eco-
nomics, 1, 368 – 383.
SWEENEY, J. L. (1974): “Housing unit maintenance and the mode of tenure,” Journal
of Economic Theory, 8, 111 – 138.
VERBRUGGE, R. (2008): “The Puzzling Divergence Of Rents And User Costs, 1980-
2004,” Review of Income and Wealth, 54, 671–699.
VERBRUGGE, R. AND R. POOLE (2010): “Explaining the Rent-OER Inflation Diver-
gence, 1999-2007,” Real Estate Economics, 38, 633–657.
31
A Identification of Ω
All the elements ofΩ are point-identified except ω12. The identified set for ω12 consists
of two points. To see this consider the following. Since Ω is rank 2, one of its columns
can be written as a linear combination of the others. This implies
ω11 = δ1ω12 +δ2ω13[
ω21
ω31
]
=
[
ω22 ω23
ω32 ω33
]
δ
where δ = (δ1,δ2) is a vector of weights. Solving the second two equations for δ yields
δ1 =
ω33ω12−ω23ω13
D
δ2 =
−ω23ω12 +ω22ω13
D
where D= ω22ω33−ω223. Substituting this into the first equation yields
ω11 = ω12
(
ω33ω12−ω23ω13
D
)
+ω13
(−ω23ω12 +ω22ω13
D
)
which is a quadratic equation in the unknown ω12. This equation can be written as
ω33
D
ω212−2
(ω23ω13
D
)
ω12 +
(
ω22ω213
D
−ω11
)
= 0.
This equation has solutions
ω12 =
ω23ω13±
√
ω223ω
2
13−ω33
(
ω22ω213−Dω11
)
ω33
.
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B Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Rent and price vs. location
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Figure 2: Ownership vs. location
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Figure 3: Rent and price vs. location: time variation
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Figure 4: Rent, price, ownership vs. size
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Figure 5: Rent, price and ownership vs. dwelling type
 
✁
✂
 
✁
✄
 
✁
☎
✆
✁
☎
✁
✄
✝
✞
✟
✠
✡
☛
☞
✌
✍
✎
✞
✟
✡
✌
✏
✑
✒
✓
✔
✕
✖
✓
✗
✘
✙
✚
✓
✖
✖
✓
✗
✘
✙
✚
✓
✖
✛
✜
✢
✣
✘
✤
✥
✦
✙
✥
✢
✧
✓
★
✗
✓
✖
✩
✤
✘
✗
✪
✜
★
✪
✥
✒
✓
✛
✜
✕
✤
✗
✩
✤
✘
✗
✫
✤
✥
✦
★
✕
✒
✓
✪
✜
★
✪
✥
✒
✓
✛
✜
✕
✤
✗
✩
✤
✘
✗
✫
✚
✕
✣
✚
★
✕
✒
✓
✬✭✮✯✯✰✱✲ ✳✴✵✮
✯✶✲ ✵✷✰✸✮ ✯✶✲ ✷✮✱✳
 
✁
 
✂
 
✄
☎
✆
✝
✞
✟
✠
✡
☛
☞
✌
✠
✍
✎
✟
✏
✑
✒
✓
✔
✑
✕
✖
✗
✘
✑
✔
✔
✑
✕
✖
✗
✘
✑
✔
✙
✚
✛
✜
✖
✢
✣
✤
✗
✣
✛
✥
✑
✦
✕
✑
✔
✧
✢
✖
✕
★
✚
✦
★
✣
✏
✑
✙
✚
✓
✢
✕
✧
✢
✖
✕
✩
✢
✣
✤
✦
✓
✏
✑
★
✚
✦
★
✣
✏
✑
✙
✚
✓
✢
✕
✧
✢
✖
✕
✩
✘
✓
✜
✘
✦
✓
✏
✑
✪✫✬✭✭✮✯✰ ✱✲✳✬
✴✫✯✬✵✶✷✮✳ ✵✸✱✬
Figure 6: Rent and price vs. size: time variation
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Figure 7: Unobserved quality vs. size
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Figure 8: Log user costs vs. characteristics z : ω33 = 0.215
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Figure 9: Log user costs vs. characteristics z: ω33 = 0.011
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Figure 10: Contracting costs vs. characteristics z: ω33 = 0.215
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Figure 11: Contracting costs vs. characteristics z: ω33 = 0.011
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Figure 12: Raw correlation between rent-to-price ratios and ownership (not controlling
for selection)
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Figure 13: Rents and prices vs. characteristics z (ignoring selection bias)
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Table 5: Estimation results - hedonics
MLE - Own MLE - Rent Probit Selection-Own Selection-Rent
Dwell. type
detached 0.2094 0.2628 0.2681 0.2690
(0.0174) (0.0922) (0.0882) (0.0881)
bungalow 0.1490 0.2286 0.5720 0.5648
(0.0225) (0.1038) (0.1157) (0.1155)
converted -0.2139 -0.4918 -0.8019 -0.8012
(0.053) (0.0796) (0.1284) (0.1285)
low rise -0.1603 -0.4130 -0.6955 -0.6975
(0.0295) (0.0567) (0.0875) (0.0873)
high rise -0.0530 -0.4226 -0.7730 -0.7765
(0.0749) (0.1248) (0.2315) (0.2313)
Dwell age
1919 - 1944 -0.0175 0.1884 0.2557 0.2583
(0.0211) (0.0602) (0.0806) (0.0806)
1945 - 1964 -0.0909 0.0481 0.2575 0.2617
(0.0205) (0.0679) (0.0869) (0.0875)
1965 - 1980 -0.1068 0.2064 0.3613 0.3643
(0.0200) (0.0685) (0.0841) (0.0842)
Post 1980 -0.0498 0.1694 0.287 0.2908
(0.0210) (0.0654) (0.0878) (0.0878)
selfReport
1 -0.0878
(0.0158)
ρ23 = corr(η2,η3) 0.1040
(0.0553)
ρ13 = corr(η1,η3) -0.9759
(0.0048)
Σ22 0.2855
(0.0096)
Σ11 0.7533
(0.0415)
ρΣ -0.0297 -0.7351
(0.0156) (0.0429)
From the 2011 wave of the EHS, using sampling weights. Omitted from the table but included in the
estimation are the polynomials in size and the location variables. Probit are coefficients from a probit
regression of all variables on a dummy for owner-occupancy.
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